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Abstract
This paper summarises our experience in using model checking technology to under-
stand concurrent programs. We use Verisoft to understand various aspects of a rewall
tool kit. We instrument three components of the rewall tool kit with Verisoft hooks in
order to test their behaviour. Some of the key changes include changing socket commu-
nication to message passing queues and adding appropriate synchronisations so that the
behaviour of the system can be tracked. We aim to minimise the number of changes to
the original source code so as to not aect its real behaviour. The main conclusion is




The need for certifying software systems is increasing. However existing standards, such as
RTCA DO178-B, are usually limited to highly safety critical software applications. The cost
of adopting such a rigorous standard has prevented its uptake in other areas. There is an
increased interest in software reliability (especially related to security issues) owing to the
internet and web based applications. Customers of not so safety critical systems are also
interested in certied software. But the level of certication need not be as stringent as say
for avionic systems.
It has been argued that using formal methods will increase the reliability of software
[Hei98, Bow94]. A concrete case study is described in [Wid99] where a simple experiment
showed the benets of formal methods. Within formal methods, techniques such as model
checking [CGP99] have almost become o the shelf technology. But this is mainly in the
context of hardware verication. This is because the requirements for successful use of model
checking includes the availability of a nite state model (not exceeding a certain size) expressed
in a specication language. Software systems do not usually meet these requirements. They
are usually much larger than typical hardware circuits and are written in languages like Java
or C. The use of both standard and user dened libraries also imposes a limitation. Thus
complete model checking of Java or C programs is not possible.
There are various approaches to reduce the size of the model associated with standard
programs. This is usually achieved by some form of static analysis such as slicing, abstraction
etc. Tools such as Bandera [CDH+00], ESC/Java based on the work reported in [LN94]
perform verication after performing some static analysis. The analysis is usually guided by
the property one is interested in verifying. They also rely on the user annotating the program
with suitable properties in terms of pre and post conditions.
A dierent approach is adopted by the tool Verisoft [GHJJ98]. It does not try to compute
the complete state space. It analyses the complete run-time behaviour of a program by
limiting the depth of the analysis. That is, all reachable states from a given state up to a
given depth are examined.
In this paper we describe a case study which uses systematic state space exploration to
understand complex programs with a view towards independent product examination. We
play the role of an outsider who can examine the source code, test it, change it etc. While
we need to change the source code to enable testing, we also aim to minimise such changes.
The main aspect we focus on is verication of key behavioural properties. That is, we do not
cover all aspects of certication. In particular we do not consider issues such as performance,
conformance to standards in a particular operating environment. But what we describe can
be extended to address the other issues. What we report is the eort required by a third
party to examine software and how this can be used in the certication process.
As the aim is to study a product, we have to examine the source code. One could argue that
one should examine a formal specication rather than the source code. Unfortunately, formal
specications are usually not available and secondly, there is no guarantee that the formal
specications correspond to the actual code. Approaches like renement [Mor94, Abr96],
which start with a formal specication and by applying correctness preserving transformations
a program is arrived at, have been proposed. However, renement is not mature enough and
not used routinely. Thus, the only option is to examine the code along with other informal
supporting documentation.
A brief overview of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the rewall
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software we are analysing, including the information we have and the type of examination we
wish to conduct. We also give a quick overview of the features of our chosen tool, Verisoft. In
Section 3 we describe the techniques required to analyse the behaviour of the rewall system
described in the previous section. That is we describe the process of instrumenting an analysis
with Verisoft, so that we can understand the behaviour of the program. In Section 4 we draw
some conclusions and suggest how the process of code inspection can be improved.
2 System and Tools
We chose to analyse the FWTK (FireWall ToolKit) system from Trusted Information Systems
(TIS) http://www.tis.com/research/software. TIS makes available the sources free of
charge for educational and research purposes. Hence it is possible to study the existing code
as well as change the code to instrument the analysis. FWTK is organised as a collection of
programs including access control (netacl), authentication (auth), and application programs
such as FTP ftp-gw, telnet tn-gw etc. This organisation makes it easier to inspect the various
components independently. These programs are supported by a common library consisting
of approximately 2400 lines of C code. In fact, the FWTK documentation states that it
is designed to be veried for correctness as a whole or at a component level. FWTK is
essentially a concurrent system with processes communicating via sockets. Being a rewall
system, it is easy to state some of the key properties the system should satisfy in a simple
fashion. For example, safety properties include that a user from a banned host must not be
allowed to login. We now describe the key aspects of the access control mechanism netacl,
the FTP gateway ftp-gw and the network authentication service authd that are relevant to
our analysis.
Netacl manages network access control expressed in terms of access form IP-address,
service requested etc. Netacl is used to block access to services such as FTP and also isolate
certain functions using the Unix call chroot. It is only about 200 lines of code and, in
principle, should be easily analysable. Netacl can be congured to allow or deny particular
services. For example, the following rule states that one can invoke an FTP server from the
host with the specied IP-number.
netacl-ftpd: permit-hosts 132.181.11.188 -exec /usr/sbin/in.ftpd -l
One of the properties we verify is that a request is accepted only if there is a suitable rule in
the conguration le.
Ftp-gw is a proxy server for FTP and like netacl permits or denies FTP commands based
on IP address. It logs all bytes that are transferred for further analysis. The program can
be used to run chroot to an empty directory and thus cannot be used to break into the
rewall. Ftp-gw consists of about 1000 lines of code and is larger than netacl. Here we do
not formally verify any property. Rather we focus on the interaction between the FTP proxy
and its operating environment. This will help understand its behaviour.
The authentication service component, authd, is an optional component of FWTK and
is required if the ftp-gw uses authentication. Authd essentially maintains a database of
users, permissions, failed and successful access etc. on a secured host. We focus on the
authentication server authsrv.c which is about 1400 lines of code. The man page for the
authentication server states what class of users may use particular commands. For example,
to use the group command the user must be authenticated as a global administrator. We
verify a variety of these properties.
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Verisoft is a tool that can be used to detect deadlocks and assertion violations in concurrent
C programs. While it uses model checking ideas, it does not compute the entire state space of a
program. It generates the relevant states up to a given depth from a given state and performs
analysis on the generated states. The C programs can communicate via message passing
(using message queues established using the Unix system call msgget), control access using
semaphores (using semget, semctl calls). One can also write Verisoft specic assertions using
the construct VS_assert(e) where e denotes a boolean expression. If e evaluates to false, an
error is signalled. One can use VS_print to print various messages. Certain operations such
as those on message queues, semaphores, assertions and VS_print are classied as visible.
Hence VS_print is dierent from printf in that the former is a hook used by Verisoft. A
global state is where all processes can only execute visible operations. The key property that
one can analyse deadlocks and assertion violations by only examining the global states is
exploited by Verisoft. Verisoft also provides a scheduler which can be used to control the
execution of the concurrent program. This allows one to study behaviours under a variety of
scheduling algorithms. Any non-determinism that is required can be simulated by the Verisoft
operation VS_toss(n) which yields a number between 0 and n. Verisoft also provides other
useful features such as a graphical presentation of the visible operations being performed and
the ability to nd a scenario leading to an undesirable state.
3 Instrumentation and Analysis
In this section we explain in detail the analysis of FWTK using Verisoft. We begin with a
few general remarks on the basic approach. We will present the details later in the section.
Our analysis is based on the notion of \as needed comprehension" while performing software
inspection [DRW00]. That is, we use Verisoft to verify our understanding of the program.
Our understanding of the behaviour of the program is obtained from the man pages and other
supporting documents.
As noted earlier, running a program under the control of Verisoft requires the program to
be annotated with appropriate visible actions. An important aspect in transforming the code
is to make as few changes to the original code as possible, thereby minimising the probability
that any new errors are introduced. As communication between processes in Verisoft is limited
to message queues and semaphores, all socket communications in FWTK has to be translated
using the message passing primitives. While it should be possible to keep the original socket
communication and add message passing only for testing purposes, this was not the case for
FWTK. The details of this will be explained when we describe the analysis. To minimise
changes to the original source code, any function that requires Verisoft additions is called
within a wrapper function. The interface to a wrapper function is kept identical to that of the
original function to keep changes minimal. This not only keeps Verisoft code separate from
the original source code but also reduces Verisoft code duplication. Ideally the only changes
required then are the replacement of particular function names with their Verisoft wrapper
equivalents. This can easily be done systematically by a search and replace technique. To
further separate the Verisoft additions from the original code, all such additions are kept in
a separate le and used in the original source via #include.
For socket calls being simulated by Verisoft message passing, there are two cases to con-
sider. In the rst case, where the receive from and send to destinations are known, socket
simulation is simple. For each socket create two message queues A and B. If processes 1 and 2
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communicate via A and B then process 1 can send data to A and receive data from B. Similarly
process 2 can send data to B and receive data from A. If communication is only half duplex
only one message queue is required. The second case, where the send to and receive from
destinations are not known and communication is full duplex. For example, when socket
descriptors are passed as arguments to functions where the functions expect one of several
socket descriptors. The problem arises because a single socket identier becomes two mes-
sage queue identiers. In these cases the processes involved know only of one message queue
identier (the queue for receiving data in our case) and the actual queue that is sent to is
determined from the receiving queue identier passed as an argument to the Verisoft wrapper
function that does the sending. A socket write call is simulated by a Verisoft send to queue
call while a socket read call is simulated by a Verisoft rcv from queue call. When data spans
several write calls, semaphores are used to force the receiving end to wait until all data has
been sent to the queue before any reading from the queue commences.
Function calls that are incompatible with Verisoft need to be replaced by some simulated
Verisoft equivalent. For example, the execv system call causes a divergence in Verisoft because
it does not return to its calling process. We simulate execv by executing the body of the
program followed by an exit system call. This explicitly informs Verisoft that the process in
question has now terminated.
We now focus on the processes that need to be created to test the behaviour of the
FWTK components. Each component interacts with a client and can also run as a daemon
process. To keep the environment as close to reality as possible at least a client (also called
the environment), and a daemon process are required. The number of client processes re-
quired depends on the component. In addition to the environment processes, a process called
process assert that keeps track of the state of the main process is implemented. Its pur-
pose is to test if particular properties of the system hold. The process process assert is
synchronised with the main process mainly through wrapper functions. For example in the
authorisation server, to let the process know when a user is being added to the database the
function auth dbputu is wrapped up in a Verisoft wrapper vs auth dbputu function which
simply sends the appropriate message to the assert process and calls the actual auth dbputu
function. In certain cases, one has to check the log le to determine the result of an operation.
This is because the function being tracked does not return a value. It just makes an entry
in the log le. While it is possible to alter the source code to return values, we did not do
so in the interests of keeping the changes to a minimum in order to understand the original
program.
Simulating an environment process is simple if the interactions with the process being
veried (termed as the main process) are understood. The simulation simply consists of
sending the appropriate data to the main process and acting appropriately on data received
from the main process. When the choice of data sent by an environment process is non-
deterministic Verisoft VS toss operations are used. This concludes the description of our
approach. We now present details of the verication carried out on the three components of
FWTK.
We summarise the general behaviour of netacl as specied in the man pages. The man
pages form the basis for our verication. Netacl runs on dierent ports for dierent applica-
tions as specied in /etc/rc.local. When it receives a request it checks the conguration
information and determines if the initiating host has the right permissions. If so, the daemon
runs and starts the program specied in the conguration table. It is also possible to chroot
to a directory and conne the user to a limited area of the system. But the chroot command
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Figure 1: Verisoft detection of failing an assertion in netacl.
can only be executed by those having super-user privileges. We verify the two key properties,
viz., a connection is accepted only if a ‘permit’ rule occurs and a normal user cannot use the
‘chroot’ option.
In order to verify these properties, two of the standard Unix system calls needed to be
modied. The rst is getpeername, which given a socket, returns the name of the host
connected to it. As we are dealing with message queues, there is no equivalent notion.
However, we do have a client (the environment) process that generates the request. Hence we
can obtain the address from the data generated by the client. This change required a minor
change to the hostmatch function used by FWTK to verify the permissions. The second is
changing execv to a Verisoft call so that divergence is not reported. This modied function
also asserts that the modied hostmatch must have returned true before the required service
program was executed. Verisoft had no diculty in verifying this requirement. If the negation
of this assertion was used, Verisoft found a run that violated this assertion.
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Consider Figure 1 which shows the details of the result. One deadlock (the lighter circle)
and four assertion violations (the darker circles) are shown. The four assertion violations
represent the four cases where the environment process is not permitted access. VS_toss
determines which of the requests one should simulate. The top part of the diagram shows the
visible set of actions performed by the processes including the messages that are exchanged
which leads to one of the assertion violations. That is, it shows the IP-address that is not
permitted in the database and is rejected by the function hostmatch. The VS_print command
is a visible action and is used to indicate which function has been invoked. More specically,
Process 2 non-deterministically chooses an IP address and sends it on queue 2 to Process 3.
This request is forwarded on queue 3 to Process 1. Process 1 determines that this host is
not permitted to connect and rejects the request. The bottom part of the diagram shows the
relevant state space computed by Verisoft. The visible actions that are shown above form a
path in the state space graph. In general, Verisoft can be used to determine how a particular
state (a point in the pruned state diagram) can be reached. One can click on the point and
the sequence of visible actions that lead to that state are displayed.
The deadlock reported is not an error as it indicates the behaviour when a process exists.
The sequence of visible actions leading to a deadlock can also be discovered using Verisoft.
As shown in Figure 2, Verisoft nds one particular behaviour that leads to deadlock. This is
when the a request is denied and the daemon terminates. In this case deadlock is not an error
but a required behaviour. The scenario shown is a completion of the behaviour described in
Figure 1. After the request has been turned down, the request to terminate the daemon send
by Process 2 is processed by Process 3.
For the second property, we tested FWTK in user mode. That is, we focused on the
behaviour of a normal user instead of the behaviour of an administrator. A simple assertion
after chroot was written. Again Verisoft had no diculty in verifying that one without root
privileges could not execute the chroot option. Verisoft explored 74 states and 73 transitions.
This was based on a depth of 50. Increasing the depth did not aect the number of states as
the violation is found within the specied depth.
We now turn our attention to the FTP proxy. The behaviour of the FTP proxy is compli-
cated as it exhibits both security/authentication interactions as well as data transfer related
interactions with the server. So we used Verisoft to rst understand the various interactions
rather than verify any particular property. We study three scenarios to convince ourselves
that the FTP proxy works as intended. In the rst scenario, the user is not permitted to
use the proxy and the program must reject the connection. In the second scenario the user
need not be authenticated while in the third scenario the user must be authenticated (using
authsrv).
Before we describe the scenarios, we outline the changes we had to make to the existing
code. In the case of FTP proxy, we needed to modify a number of Unix system calls. These
include select, bind, listen etc. These are all related to the socket calls and we have to
translate them to equivalent calls on message queues. We also needed to add semaphores
to prevent concurrent writing or reading on the same queues especially when a message is
split into more than one part. In principle, one can use both message queues and sockets
together. That is, sockets would be used as per the original program while message queues
would be used only for Verisoft booking keeping. However, this was not possible in this case
as it caused a divergence error from Verisoft. This is related to the way the server listens to
sockets. As there is no known deadline on when listening succeeds, we needed to change the
code to use only message passing.
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Figure 2: Verisoft nding a deadlock in netacl.
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Figure 3: Verisoft scenario of user being denied access.
Consider the behaviour shown in Figure 3. The rst process is ftp-gw, the second is the
environment, the third process is the server while the fourth is the daemon. In this case the
server is not activated and thus takes part in no interaction. This behaviour is similar to
that seen for netacl. As the rules do not allow the host to use the FTP proxy, the request
is rejected directly. The interaction shown in Figure 4 shows when a host is permitted. The
request is accepted and the proxy is ready to connect to the FTP server. Note that for these
behaviours, the server has not taken part in any interaction.
The third scenario is more complicated and is presented in Figure 5. After a request
is accepted from a permitted host, the proxy is ready to authenticate the user. The client
process simulates a user entering the system and being prompted to send a password. If the
password is valid, the user is authenticated to the proxy and the proxy is ready to connect to
the server. From a user’s perspective this is not surprising. However, it was hard to extract
this information from the source code. One of the problems was that the ftp-gw uses a table
of pointers to functions. Depending on the interaction, a suitable index is computed and the
function invoked. It is quite impossible to verify by reading the code that the right functions
are invoked. Verisoft helped convince ourselves that the right functions were indeed invoked.
Verisoft explored 246 states and 277 transitions before diverging. This is because once the
connection is established we do not simulate the behaviour of a user actually interacting with
the ftp server.
Our nal inspection deals with the authentication server. As noted earlier we need the
process assert process. It maintains the state of the authentication server through messages
it receives from the server. The process uses its knowledge of the server’s state to check if
particular properties hold in the current state. To minimise changes to authsrv itself, most
state messages are sent to process assert via the wrapper functions. For example, whenever
a permission denied log message is issued process assert is told permission has been denied
and it updates its state and checks various properties hold as appropriate.
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Figure 4: Verisoft scenario of user not requiring authentication.
The properties we tested were influenced by the description of the behaviour in the man
pages. For example, it states what class of users may use particular commands. A partic-
ular instance is that to use the group command the user must be authenticated as a global
administrator. All of these permission type properties have been demonstrated to hold (via
assertions) on each class of user with one exception. For these analyses, Verisoft explored
408131 states and 515942 transitions. This was to a depth of 100. We also reduced the state
space by providing the message passing topology information to Verisoft. We did not do this
for the other components, as we were examining the overall behaviour and did not want to
pre-judge the communication possibilities.
The man page states the password command can only be used by a global administrator
or a group administrator of the group to which the user whose password is being changed/set
belongs. However, the authentication server also permits any authenticated user to change
their own password. This is more likely to be an error in the documentation rather than an
error in the code. Figure 6 depicts this error as reported by Verisoft. Here the four processes
are as follows. The rst two are as before, viz., authsrv and the environment respectively.
The third process is the daemon while the nal process is process assert that is used to
synchronise with authsrv.
It captures both the interaction that has occurred as well as the location in each process
when the assertion error is detected. It is the examination of the source code at this point
that led us to believe that the error was in the documentation.
This concludes our discussion of the analysis of three aspects of the FWTK software. In
summary, the following were the steps necessary to test various aspects of the rewall.
1. Identify system properties to be checked. These would ideally be documented in the
description of the software.
2. If the system has many processes, create a new main process to generate all the other
processes. This is required by Verisoft.
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Figure 5: Verisoft scenario of user requiring authentication.
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Figure 6: Verisoft detection of the password command failing an assertion
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3. Identify any type of interprocess communication used and replace with Verisoft message
queues. This is likely to involve steps 4 and 5. If the topology of message passing is
know, one can provide that information to Verisoft.
4. Identify code incompatible with Verisoft and create wrapper functions for this code.
For example, system calls such as read and write which use le descriptors must be
instrumented with appropriate wrapper functions that read and write data to message
queues. This can be in conjunction with or be replacement for operations involving
sockets, le descriptors etc.
5. Replace the original function calls with the wrapper function calls.
6. Implement the processes that model the environment for the processes under analysis.
That is, these processes should provide a simulated environment for the main process
under analysis.
7. Implement a procedure to track the state of the main process under analysis. This can
either be a separate process or some code periodically executed by the main process.
(a) Introduce additional wrapper functions to report on the state of the main process.
These functions will typically send a message to the state tracker process and call
the replaced function.
(b) Add assertions to the state tracker process to verify the identied properties hold.
We now present some of the diculties faced when trying to use Verisoft. While some
of these are due to the requirements of Verisoft, the others pertain to the way the software
is written. Verisoft requires that all required message queues must be created before the
initial global state is reached. Hence we predene a large number which are allocated on
demand. While this was adequate for our testing, it is not clear if this will always be the
case. Similarly, the number of processes should also be xed and dened in the conguration
le. Hence dynamic process creating was not possible. So it was not possible to test multiple
rounds of requests from the environment. We could have changed the source code to loop
rather than exit (or execute execv) to simulate multiple rounds. However, that require more
extensive changes to the source code that we were comfortable with. In some cases Verisoft
runs into livelock problems. This is due to the way the vs select function, the wrapper for
the select call needs to implemented. Unfortunately there is no simple solution as there is
no bound on when vs_select may have anything to select and what it can select. We had
to increase it to a large value like 1000 to enable Verisoft to analyse the program. However
this was more of a trial and error technique.
Except for concurrency and VS toss operations, Verisoft assumes that the system being
tested is deterministic. This assumption produces an error during automatic Verisoft simula-
tion of the authentication server. The actions taken by authsrv are dependent on the state
of its database le which can be modied during a Verisoft simulation. It is assumed that this
violates the above assumption because it is possible that replaying a specic scenario may
have a dierent outcome due to a dierent database state. For example, the problem arises
whenever a user’s database account is disabled. The disabling modies the database state
which cannot be reversed during the replaying of scenarios where the user was previously en-
abled. To make the process deterministic, the database must be re-initialised between paths
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in the state space. Since this can not be done during automatic simulation mode, an exhaus-
tive search of the authentication server state space up to some depth when all functionality
is examined was not possible. However, an exhaustive search may be possible if the functions
that modify the database state are not veried. We could also examine one scenario at a time
and reset the database after the analysis of each scenario.
We were also unable to verify conditions such as all transactions are logged. This was
because we had no easy access to when a transaction was initiated. The source code does not
provide any direct feature that we could use. Note that we could verify well dened aspects of
a transaction. For example, conditions such as when a user exits it is logged can be veried.
This is because the user exiting is well dened. In general, the code needs to be structured
so that Verisoft hooks can be added in a routine way. Extensive changes to the software is
both time consuming and has the potential of introducing errors not originally present.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We were able to gain a thorough understanding of the aspects of FWTK that we studied.
We can state with some assurance that the program behaviours we examined are reasonably
robust. It has taken about 150 man hours to complete this task. This included installing the
Verisoft and FWTK systems, examining the documentation, deciding which aspects to verify
and test and actually carrying out the required inspection. Although this is only the rst
step, the results seems to indicate that independent examination of source code with Verisoft
is indeed viable.
One of the main limitations is that we can test only one conguration. The code has
various ifdefs and we need to automate the testing of all these congurations. We have also
not tested all the features of the programs we have examined. For example, there are various
ways that authentication can work including DES, one-time passwords, challenge response
calculators. We have not examined any of these { we have assumed that the authentication
is robust.
More generally, we need to identify coding practices that will simplify the inspection pro-
cess. These could include, for instance, key functions could be presented as wrapper functions
which the inspector can extend, there should be a variable or function that corresponds di-
rectly to a key behavioural level concept (such as transactions). We intend to study the
Tripwire system (http://www.tripwiresecurity.com) to gain further experience and arrive
at concrete recommendations.
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